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NORTH KOREAN TIME BOMB: CAN SANCTIONS DEFUSE IT? A
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS AN OPTION*
North Korea, with its major nuclear weapons program,' is posing its
greatest threat to world peace since the attack on South Korea in 1950.2 For
more than two years, North Korea has played games with the West over its
nuclear program by promising access to International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) inspectors as is required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT),' and then delaying and dismissing such inspections as attempted
* The author would like to express gratitude to Christian Pitschas for his guidance and
constructive criticism.
' See William Perry, U.S. Security Policy in Korea, Address to the Asia Society (May 3,
1994), in U.S DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 9, 1994, at 275-79.
2 Korea was a Japanese colony from 1910 until 1945 when Japan surrendered to the
United States. The northern region became occupied by the communists, and the U.N.
Temporary Commission which was established to monitor free elections in Korea was unable
to secure access into North Korea. The Commission observed elections in the area south of
the 38th parallel of latitude, and the Government of the Republic of Korea [hereinafter South
Korea] was declared lawful and the only Government in Korea by the General Assembly in
its resolution 195 (i1), adopted on December 12, 1948. RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY CouNcn. (1946-1992)-A THEMATIC GUIDE 323 (Karel C.
Wellens ed., 1993).
North Korean forces invaded the territory of South Korea on June 25, 1950, which the
Security Council declared a breach of peace. S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473rd,
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev. 1 (1950). The Security Council Called upon all Member States
to render every assistance necessary, including military forces, to repel the armed attack and
to restore international peace and security in the area. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess.,
474th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev. 1 (1950).
1 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968,
21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
represents an agreement between five nuclear weapons powers (Britain, China, France, Russia,
and the United States) and 160 other parties which do not have nuclear weapons. The parties
agree to pursue cessation of the nuclear arms race and allow monitoring of nuclear programs
by the International Atomic Energy Agency [hereinafter IAEA], which monitors compliance
with the NPT: "Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept
safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International
Atomic Energy Agency... " Id. at art. Ill(l). The NPT purports to slow the spread of
nuclear weapons. Although North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, it was not until April 1992
that it formally authorized the IAEA to undertake inspection of its three declared nuclear
facilities. Nayan Chanda, Atomic Shock Waves, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 25, 1993, at 10-11.
See also Nayan Chanda, Point-Counterpoint, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 2, 1994, at 16
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violations of national sovereignty.4 When the IAEA became suspicious that
North Korea was attempting to disguise its nuclear reprocessing history,
North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT.5 Even through periods
of seemingly conciliatory diplomatic talks,6 North Korea has continued to
refuse access to the waste sites in question, which seems to confirm
suspicions of illegal nuclear reprocessing.'
The danger presented by the North Korean nuclear program is not limited
to the Asian community. The threat extends to the rest of the world because
of North Korea's history of exporting weapons technology, especially to
regions of instability around the world.8 If North Korea develops a nuclear
arsenal, there is a danger that other hostile, rogue states around the world
will soon follow.9 It may also drive others in the Pacific basin, notably
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, to follow suit in self-defense.' ° This trend
would frustrate the stated purpose of the NPT, to achieve "the cessation of
(describing the suspicions and doubts that arose from the inspections); Nayan Chanda, Bomb
and Bombast, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 10, 1994, at 16-18. For more information on the
NPT, see generally William Epstein & Paul C. Szasz, Extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty: A Means of Strengthening the Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 735.
4 See Time to Play Tough, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 22, 1994, at 20.
5 See, e.g., Robert Greenberger, North Korea Has New Threat in Nuclear Issue; Nation
Says It Will Quit IAEA, Expel Officials; U.S. Pursues Sanctions, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1994,
at All.
6 After periods of unsuccessful negotiations, North Korea's tone turned conciliatory
following mediation by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter in June 1994. See, e.g., Art Pine,
N. Korea, in Abrupt Shift, Offers Plan to Restart U.S. Talks; Diplomacy: Pyongyang Delivers
Compromise through Ex-President Carter, L.A. TIMES, June 17, 1994, at A1; U.S. Tentatively
Moving Back to Talks with North Korea, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, June 17, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
'Philippe Naughton, U.S., N. Korea Take Break from Nuclear Talks, REUTER LIR. REP.,
Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Treuwl File; Peter Nordahl, N. Korea
Rejects Call to Open A-Plants, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 26, 1994, at 20. The NPT
prohibits "the diversion of nuclear energy from uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices." NPT, supra note 3, at pmbl.
' North Korea has sold Scud missiles to Syria and Iran, and is actively marketing its next
generation of ballistic missiles. See Perry, supra note 1, at 276, for a more detailed summary
of North Korea's weapons program.
9 Id. See also John T. Correll, Rehearsal for Crises to Come, AIR FORCE MAG., Aug.
1994, at 2 (suggesting that Iran, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Syria will eventually possess
nuclear weapons).
10 Perry, supra note 1, at 277. See also Lloyd R. Vasey, Act Now and Build a Coalition
to Bring North Korea in Line, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 20, 1994, at 18.
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the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of
nuclear disarmament."'"
There is a general consensus that the North Koreans must be stopped from
developing nuclear weapons if the anti-proliferation policy is to work.'
Otherwise, the world faces the dangerous prospect that many aggressive
political leaders will possess nuclear weapons. 3 Further, permitting North
Korea to continue its defiant dismissal of international order may send a
message to other potential violators of international law that blackmail
works.'
4
There are basically three ways that the United States and its allies can deal
with this crisis: first, do nothing; second, take military action; and third,
pursue a diplomatic strategy to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear
weapons program. 5 Doing nothing and acquiescing now to an active North
Korean nuclear program would invite a future nuclear crisis; taking military
action now would invite an immediate crisis and would not be legally
justified.'6 Therefore, a diplomatic strategy with incentives for North Korea
may be the most plausible middle ground approach to bring North Korea to
the negotiation table and persuade it to comply with the NPT. 7 The threat
" NPT, pmbl., para. 9.
12 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 1, at 276-77; Vasey, supra note 10, at 18; Michael Remez,
State Residents Perceive Increased Korea Threat, HARTFORD COURANT, June 25, 1994, at A1;
David Kay, Analyst Says U.S. Must Push for Sanctions for N. Korea, CNN, June 2, 1994,
Transcript # 784-4, available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN File.
"3 The NPT anticipated that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council-the United States, Russia (former Soviet Union), Britain, France, and China-would
be the world's only nuclear powers. However, Israel, Pakistan, and India are assumed to
already have nuclear status. In addition, North Korea, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina, and Algeria
have nuclear programs that have triggered concern. See John Kampfner & Roger Highfield,
List Grows of Regimes Linked to Smuggling, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 19, 1994, at 8.
German authorities recently arrested four black market brokers of Russian-made plutonium.
Iraq, Pakistan, and North Korea are suspected to have been among the prospective buyers.
Id.
"' See generally Bruce W. Nelan, Cooling-Off Period, TIME, Aug. 22, 1994, at 42;
America and North Korea; Progress, Perhaps, ECONOMIST, Aug. 13, 1994, at 32.
Perry, supra note 1, at 277.
16 Id.
17 Richard D. Fisher, Jr., a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, made the
following suggestions regarding the diplomatic approach to take in dealing with North Korea:
(1) require North Korea not only to "freeze" its nuclear weapons program but also to
dismantle its plutonium producing nuclear reactors and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing plants;
(2) coordinate U.S.-North Korean negotiations as well as the North-South summit; (3) make
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of universal economic sanctions is a part of the U.S. diplomatic strategy for
the North Korean crisis.
This Note will review the legal background for the imposition of universal
economic sanctions against a state and discuss the special circumstances
which will affect the outcome of the economic sanctions currently being
considered. The effects of recent U.N. economic sanctions against the
former Yugoslavia and Haiti will be analyzed to better predict a probable
outcome of economic sanctions against North Korea. A look at the past
history of economic sanctions may suggest an insightful method of insuring
positive results from the international economic sanctions.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
A. Definition
Economic sanctions can be defined as deliberate government actions to
inflict economic deprivation on a target country of "customary" trade or
financial relations.18  Economic sanctions can include embargoes on
clear to North Korea that full diplomatic relations and trade will follow the verified
termination of its nuclear weapons program; (4) prepare to resume seeking international
economic sanctions by seeking agreement with other nations if North Korea refuses; and (5)
strengthen American military forces in South Korea and Japan to deter any surprise attack
from North Korea. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Fixing Jimmy Carter's Mistakes: Regaining the
Initiative against North Korea, HERITAGE FOuND. REP., July 8, 1994.
IS GARY C. HUFBAUER El" AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND
CURRENT POLICY 2 (1985); DAvID LEYTON-BROWN, THE UTILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 1 (1987). Cf. Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions:
Improving the Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1166 (1987) (defining
economic sanctions as "coercive" economic measures taken against one or more countries to
attempt to force a change in policies).
The terms "economic boycott" and "embargo" are often used interchangeably with
"economic sanctions." Differences exist, however, between these terms. An "economic
boycott" implies no force of law and carries no coercive tone, and is a retaliatory action
involving suspension of trade. An "economic boycott" is weaker in force than "embargo".
The term "embargo" is a legal prohibition of trade or commerce by government order and
carries the force of law. Embargoes have been undertaken to force countries to cease
assertedly illegal or undesirable activities. M. S. DAOUDI & M. S. DAJANI, ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 2-9 (1983).
A "sanction" is a "collective action against a state considered to be violating international
law taken to compel that state to conform." A sanction may entail breaking diplomatic and
economic relations, or taking military action. It uses retaliatory and deprivatory effects to
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financial and commercial dealings, restriction or severance of communica-
tions of all kinds, and restrictions or prohibitions on the use of all kinds of
transport."' Economic sanctions may take one or more of the following
forms:
A ban on imports from the target state is intended to
produce a shortage of foreign exchange and unemployment
in export industries; a ban on exports to the target state is
intended to deprive it of essential commodities. Financial
sanctions can deprive the target of access to foreign capital
and money markets. Interference with communication can
have serious economic effects, as well as producing a
psychological feeling of isolation.2'
These measures can be imposed unilaterally by one country against another
or multilaterally by a group of countries or by an international organization.
This Note will concentrate on the international economic sanctions that have
been adopted by either the League of Nations or the United Nations.
B. League of Nations and Economic Sanctions
The modern use of economic sanctions was pioneered largely by the
League of Nations, which was created after World War I.21 Member states
of the League of Nations agreed that a non-military deterrent was needed in
the Covenant of the League to enforce the peace. Thus, the concept of
collective security guaranteed by collective sanctions became embedded in
encourage and secure conformity to international law. Sanctions contain the element of
threat, and the sender countries have two major purposes: to punish the target country by
depriving it of something of value and/or to make it comply with certain norms the senders
deem important. Id. See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 2008-09
("sanction"), 264 ("boycott"), 738-39 ("embargo") (1981).
19 MARGARET P. DOXEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT 97
(1971).
2 Id.
2 WILLIAM H. KAEMPFER & ANTON D. LOWENBERG, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS 1 (1992).
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the Covenant of the League of Nations.22 The objective of the economic
sanctions was to cause economic isolation of a target state by denying it all
commercial, financial, and trade facilities.23
The League of Nations has used economic sanctions on only four
occasions: against Yugoslavia (1921), Greece (1925), Paraguay and Bolivia
(1932-1935), and Italy (1936).24 Economic sanctions against Italy, which
were imposed in response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (now
Ethiopia), fell into disarray mainly because several League members refused
to participate.25 The League of Nations was relatively powerless to enforce
participation by members who chose not to apply the sanctions,' and
sanctions were no longer used by the League after the Italian episode.
C. The United Nations and Economic Sanctions
Due to the failure of the League of Nations' sanctions, the Charter of the
United Nations does not contain the term "sanctions," but instead refers to
"effective collective measures"'27 and "preventive or enforcement mea-
2 The Covenant of the League of Nations was adopted in April 1916. Article XVI of the
Covenant describes the member states' obligation to impose economic measures against a
member state which violated the Covenant: "severance of all trade or financial relations, the
prohibition of all intercourse... and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal
intercourse of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not." LEAGUE OF
NATIONS CovENANT art. 16. DAOUDI & DAJANi, supra note 18, at 57 (citing F. P. WALTERS,
A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 51 (1965)).
2 Id. at 58 (citing ALBERT E. HINDMARSH, FORCE IN PEACE 152 (1933)). These
economic sanctions were compulsory, while the military sanctions were of facultative
character. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 700-
01 (1985).
The League of Nations imposed sanctions (1) against Yugoslavia in 1921 over a border
dispute (the threat of economic sanctions was enough to compel Yugoslavia to withdraw its
troops from Albania); (2) against Greece in 1925 for a border skirmish between Greece and
Bulgaria (the threat alone was sufficient to persuade Greece to evacuate Bulgarian territory);
(3) against Paraguay and Bolivia in 1932-35 for skirmishes between Paraguay and Bolivia
over Chaco (sanctions had little effect on the outcome); and (4) against Italy in 1935-36 for
the invasion of Abyssinia (ultimate failure was due to numerous member states refusing to
apply sanctions). See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 18, at 128-36, 142-49.
25 See DOxEY, supra note 19, at 103.
26 Id. For a more detailed assessment of Italian sanctions, see DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra
note 18, at 60-72; Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, The "Economic Weapon ": The League and the
United Nations, 58 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 183 (1964).
27 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
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sures"' in which "all members shall give every assistance." '29
1. Economic Sanctions By Member States
Economic sanctions are often used by one state against another as a means
of pressuring the target country to change its policies. Although economic
sanctions have characteristics of coercion, they do not appear to be "the
threat or use of force," which is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. ° It appears generally accepted that Article 2(4) should not be
extended to cover the use of economic force," and that the use of economic
force should be regulated by the duty of non-intervention.32 However,
international agreements concerning international trade relations normally
contain provisions, such as the most-favored-nation clauses in GATT (The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), aimed at prohibiting coercive
economic measures.33
Prior to the twentieth century, states solved disputes among themselves
primarily through the use of force-by waging war against one another.'
The U.N. Charter has prohibited the use of force, however, and customary
7 Id. at art. 2, para. 5.
2 id.
3' This prohibition belongs to the field of customary international law. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27) 188, 202.
31 It was decided at the San Francisco Conference, which led to the final version of the
U.N. Charter, that economic sanctions are not a "use of force" under Article 2(4). U.N.
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 334, 609 (1945). See
generally Restraints on the Unilateral Use of Force: A Colloquy, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 261
(1985); Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971). See also FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS,
THE WESTERN STATE SYSTEM AND THE WORLD COMMUNITY 145 (6th ed. 1958) (asserting
that economic measures such as sanctions are "always within the bounds of customary
international law").
32 MAKIO MIYAGAWA, DO ECONOMIC SANCrIONS WORK? 78 (1992).
33 Id. at 78-79. An argument exists that Article XXI of the GAIT seems to authorize the
coercive economic measures by a state against another in certain situations. See Clinton E.
Cameron, Note, Developing a Standard for Politically Related State Economic Action, 13
MICH. J. INT'L L. 218 (1991). Article XXI provides that the GATT should not be construed
to "prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the
protection of its essential security interests... taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct.
30, 1947, art. XXI(b)(iii), 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
34 Cameron, supra note 33.
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law has developed around the prohibition.35 Member states of the United
Nations are now obligated to submit all disputes to peaceful modes of
settlement,m and with the exception of the right of self-defense, the use of
force is outlawed for individual states." Because nations lack other
effective legal means to force violators of international law to change their
policies,3M economic sanctions have been utilized with increasing frequency
in the second half of the twentieth century. 39 These economic sanctions
have supported a broad variety of goals, e.g., to improve the observance of
human rights,40 to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons,4 and to discour-
age terrorism42 and drug smuggling 43 around the world.
35 id.
3 U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. Article 33(1) states, "The parties to any dispute...
shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice." Id.
3" DOXEY, supra note 19, at 11.
38 See IAN BROWNLiE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362
(1963); DEREK W. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (1958).
3 The United States has been the dominant user of sanctions, followed by the United
Kingdom. Kimberly A. Elliott, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 169 (1991). Elliott states that the effectiveness of U.S.
sanctions against other countries has sharply declined because of the U.S. decline in the world
economy. Id.
o The United States imposed economic sanctions in the form of substantial cutbacks in
economic and military aid to South Korea in order to improve human rights following
President Park's declaration of martial law in 1972. GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 64 (1983).
4' In 1975-76, the United States and Canada threatened financial and export sanctions to
persuade South Korea not to buy a French reprocessing plant that could produce weapons-
grade nuclear materials. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 18, at 505-07. In another case,
Canada suspended uranium shipments to Japan and the European Community to force them
to accept Canadian safeguards against using nuclear material for explosive purposes. See
GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, SUPPLEMENTAL CASE
HISTORIES 449-51 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter HUFBAUER ET AL., CASE HISTORIES).
42 The United States imposed economic sanctions against Iraq in 1980-82 for its terrorist
activities. HUFBAUER ET AL., CASE HISTORIES, supra note 41, at 524-31.
'3 The United States imposed economic sanctions against Bolivia in 1979-82 to condemn
Colonel Busch's military coup and the Bolivian government's lack of cooperation with the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Id. at 518-23.
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2. Universal Economic Sanctions By the U.N. Security Council
The United Nations may impose economic sanctions under the Charter to
pursue its peacekeeping responsibilities outlined in Article 1, but Article 2(7)
prohibits intervention in matters which are "essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction" of any state.4
Pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, the U.N. Security Council may
institute an enforcement action against a particular state to maintain or
restore international peace and security. 5 Such actions against offending
states, however, require a unanimous affirmative vote from all permanent
members of the Security Council.'
4 The principle of non-intervention in Article 2(7) does not prejudice enforcement
measures under Chapter VII. The United Nations has intervened in cases where essentially
domestic conflicts resulted in gross violations of human rights. The U.N. sanctions against
Somalia in 1992 and against Haiti in 1993 indicate a trend toward "humanitarian intervention"
by the United Nations. Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention of the UN: Towards
the Development of Criteria, 53 ZErrSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTE RECHT AND
VOLKERRECHT 558, 564-67 (1993) (describing cases, e.g., Rhodesia (1968), Iraq (1991), and
Somalia (1992), where human rights violations within a state constituted a "threat to peace"
or "threat to international peace and security" sufficient to invoke the Security Council's
authority to authorize coercive measures). For more discussion of the principle of
interdiction, see Owen D. Jones, The Box H Problem: A Justification for Unilateral
International Coercion, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 207, 250 (1990).
45 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
4 A decision by the Security Council requires an affirmative vote of at least nine of the
15 members, including unanimous vote from the five permanent members. The five
permanent members are China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. See Kim
R. Nossal, Economic Sanctions in the League of Nations and the United Nations, in THE
UTa~rlY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTONs 19 (David Leyton-Brown ed., 1987)
(contending that universal sanctions are likely to founder because of the nature of inter-state
relations).
The Security Council's difficulty with the unanimity requirement was clearly demonstrated
during the Korean conflict in 1950. Due to the Soviet Union's voluntary absenteeism, the
Council was able to take military action against North Korea for its surprise attack on South
Korea on June 25, 1950. However, when the Council attempted an arms embargo against
China for providing military support for North Korea, the Council's proposal was vetoed by
the Soviet Union. The General Assembly, then, acting under the Uniting for Peace
Resolution, recommended an arms embargo against China as an additional economic measure.
DOXEY, supra note 19, at 12-13, 59-60. The General Assembly's Uniting for Peace
Resolution reads in part:
[The General Assembly] [r]esolves that if the Security Council, because
of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its
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a. Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
will be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.'
Article 39 of the Charter gives the Security Council broad discretion to
determine whether any "threat to the peace," "breach of the peace," or "act
of aggression" has occurred.s The Charter does not define these terms;
rather, the existence of such threats has been determined by the, Security
Council on an ad hoc basis.
49
Once the decision is made, the door is opened to the various measures the
Council may take under Articles 41 and 42. The Council may implement
not only the measures enumerated under Article 41, but also other non-
military measures. 5° Sanctions often escalate from "selective optional
sanctions" through an intermediate stage of "selective mandatory sanctions"
and finally reaching "comprehensive mandatory sanctions."5' This process
may take a long time.
b. Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not
involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall
consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the
case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression.
G.A. Res. 377(V), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 20, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
47 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
48 See, e.g., Myers S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, Rhodesia and the United
Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
See LELAND M.GOODRJCH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 295 (3d rev. ed.
1969). For a discussion of international efforts to define these terms in relation to economic
measures taken by an individual state against another, see Cameron, supra note 33.
" DOXEY, supra note 19, at 9. •
51 RALPH ZACKLIN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND RHODESIA 45 (1974).
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effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may
include complete or partial interruption of economic rela-
tions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations. 2
This provision gives the Security Council great flexibility in the choice of
means to pursue its ends, in contrast to the automatic boycott prescribed by
League of Nations Article XVI. 3 While Article XVI of the Covenant
placed upon all members of the League the binding obligation to apply the
enumerated sanctions immediately, Article 41 of the Charter gives the
Council the freedom to decide whether such measures shall be used, and if
so, what specifically these measures are to be.'
c. Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided
for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Such action may include demon-
strations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations. 5
Article 42 provides for harsher measures than those of Article 41 and is
implemented when necessary due to the urgency of the situation (as in the
case of the Korean War in 1950) or when the measures under Article 41 are
inadequate (as is the case of Haiti). Demonstrations of force and military
blockades used to increase the effectiveness of economic measures fall under
2 U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
53 ZACKLIN, supra note 51, at 91.
5 DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note 18, at 77.
SS U.N. CHARTER art. 42. On the question of whether the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) can review the decisions of the Security Council, see Thomas M. Franck, The "Powers
of Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardian of U.N. Legality?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519
(1992). See also W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993) (discussing the boundary between the competence of the Security
Council and the ICJ).
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the scope of Article 42. Military measures can be organized by the Security
Council (but only on an ad hoc and voluntary basis because agreements to
make military contingents available to the Security Council have never been
concluded).
The Security Council derives leverage from the influence its members can
exercise in pursuit of its objectives. The strength of Council action lies
especially where the combined influence of Council members is enforced by
the influence of other general member states cooperating with the Council
to support the Council's objective.56
Until recently, however, this system of collective action was not utilized
often.57 Before the current economic sanctions against Haiti and the former
Yugoslavia, the Security Council applied mandatory economic sanctions only
three times: against Rhodesia (1966-79), 5' South Africa (1977-91, arms
only), 9 and Iraq ( 19 90 ).'
' V.A. Kremenuk, The Ways and Means for the International Community to Prevent and
Solve Local Regional Conflicts, in THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN INTERDEPEN-
DENT WORLD 93 (John P. Renninger ed., 1989).
" Relations among the states during the Cold War, especially among the permanent
members of the Security Council, posed an obstacle to utilization of collective actions. See
supra note 44 (providing an example of the General Assembly's function in the event that
inter-state relations prevent unanimity of the permanent members).
m S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23rd Sess., 1428th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev. 1
(1968). Mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia in 1965 were the most celebrated, as they
marked an important step in international affairs. The sanctions were imposed against the
regime of Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith, who declared Rhodesia's independence from
the British government before the British design to grant independence took place (the British
design would have resulted in black majority rule). For the first time, the major powers had
not only agreed to accept sanctions but had pushed for their adoption. Despite high
expectations, economic sanctions against Rhodesia were "not as debilitating as expected," and
it took 14 years before the Rhodesian government acceded to black majority rule in December
1979. See HUFDAUER ET AL., supra note 18, at 409-17.
" S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32nd Sess., 2046th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1977). For
a detailed history of the economic sanctions against South Africa, see HUFBAUER ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 346-60.
60 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990). See
BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1305-18 (1991). See also
The Gulf War: The Law of International Sanctions, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 169
(1991). Cf. Shaw J. Dallal, International Law and the United Nations' Role in the Gulf
Crisis, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 111 (1992) (arguing that the Security Council's
decision to use armed force in Iraq was illegal and premature).
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3. Binding Nature of Security Council Decisions
The decisions of the Security Council on matters of international peace
and security are binding upon the member states.6 Nonmembers, as well
as member states, are required to act consistently with the principles
contained in the opening articles of the Charter.62
Though there are still some conflicting opinions about whether non-
member states are bound by the U.N. sanctions resolutions,' it is generally
accepted that measures taken by the Security Council to maintain or restore
international peace and security under Article 39 are binding and carry the
force of law." The United Nations has no permanent organized force for
securing obedience to the law similar to that which exists in a modem
state. The obligatory character of the rules of international law comes
instead from "the empirical facts that states will insist on their rights under
such rules against states which they consider should observe them, and that
states recognize international law as binding upon them."' 6 The binding
nature of the Council's decisions is important because participation of every
state, both member and nonmember, is a crucial factor in the success of
economic sanctions.
6 U.N. CHARTER art. 25. Under Article 25, member states agree to accept and carry out
the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. The Council can make
two types of decisions: voluntary and mandatory. Based on the authority of the Charter
resolutions, measures adopted under Article 39 are binding in nature and carry the force of
law. DOXEY, supra note 19, at 74. See also ALF Ross, THE CoNsTrrTIONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONs (1950).
6 Nossal, supra note 46.
A number of international lawyers, including D. von Schenck and Rudolf Bindschedler,
have argued that nonmembers have no obligation to abide by sanctions resolutions; others,
such as Hans Kelsen, have argued that an obligation for non-members to participate in the
United Nations measures does exist. D. von Schenck, The Problem of the Participation of
the Federal Republic of Germany in Sanctions of the United Nations, with Special Regard for
the Case of Rhodesia, (Summary in English), ZErrSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT AND V6LKERRECWr 29, 2 (May 1969); Rudolf Bindschedler, The. Problem of the
Participation of Switzerland in Sanctions of the United Nations, with Special Regard for the
Case of Rhodeesia, (Summary in English), ZErrscHRn"r FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT AND VOLKERRECHT 28, 1 (March 1968).
6LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 161 (3d rev. ed.
1969).
6 JOSEPH G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (10th ed. 1989).
" Id. at 31.
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRISIS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA
A. North Korea's Game with the International Community
The present crisis in the Korean peninsula came into sharp focus when
North Korea threatened to withdraw from the International Atomic Energy
Agency in March 1994. The threat came in response to IAEA demands for
North Korea to open its two suspected nuclear waste sites for inspection and
a U.S. plan to seek economic sanctions. 7 North Korea, as a party to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is obligated to follow all safeguards in the
non-military use of nuclear power and to allow the IAEA to take samples to
verify official declarations regarding the fissile material."
In the course of six previous inspections in 1993, 69 North Korea admitted
to the IAEA that it had reprocessed nuclear fuel from a research reactor to
produce a "tiny" amount of plutonium-the raw material of atomic
weapons-for research purposes. 70 However, the term "research purposes"
is not likely to describe the full truth. As Secretary of Defense William
Perry explained:
6 See, e.g., Ed Paisley, Prepared for the Worst: Neither Carrots Nor Sticks Could Budge
Pyongyang, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb. 10, 1994, at 22; U.S. Seeks Sanction against North
Korea, CHICAGO TRM., Mar. 20, 1994, § 1, at 5; Why Prioritize Pyongyang?, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 1994, at B6.
" See supra note 3; Nayan Chanda, Forgive and Forget?, FAR E. ECON. REv., May 12,
1994, at 14.
69 Although North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, it was not until April 1992 that it
formally authorized the IAEA to undertake inspection of its three declared nuclear facilities.
For detailed circumstances surrounding the inspection request,
see generally Chanda, Bomb and Bombast, supra note 3; Nayan Chanda, Seal of Disapproval,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 31, 1994, at 14-15.
0 John Hughes, North Korea: What We Don't Know Could Be Dangerous, CHRISTIAN
Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 18, 1994, at 18. A load of spent fuel from the nuclear reactors, if
processed after being removed from the reactor, would provide plutonium, a raw material
necessary for building a nuclear bomb. The operating nuclear reactor in North Korea was
shut down for reprocessing of its core units in 1989 and at least three times since then. Each
reprocessing of the North Korean reactor produced enough plutonium to build a nuclear
bomb. Theoretically, the North Koreans could have built one bomb per year since 1989. Id.
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[W]e do know with certainty that the North Koreans have an
operational 25-megawatt nuclear reactor;71 they have under
construction a second, 200-megawatt reactor; they have a
large reprocessing plant for separating plutonium from
reactor spent fuel; they have radio-chemistry laboratories;
and they have a high explosive testing facility, all located in
Yongbyon. We also know that when the 200-megawatt
reactor is completed in a few years, it will have the potential
to produce enough material for 10-12 nuclear bombs a year.
The most reasonable explanation for this known collection
of facilities is a nuclear weapons program.72
According to military experts, North Korea may already have one or two
bombs 7" and be able to produce a half dozen more with the plutonium from
the 8,000 fuel rods presently stored in the cooling pond.74 The fate of these
fuel rods has been the most urgent topic of the diplomatic talks because they
will start to corrode and leak dangerous radioactivity if not dealt with in the
immediate future.
7
If the rods were reprocessed, which the North Koreans have said is
necessary for safety reasons, the yield would be more than 20 pounds of
plutonium, which could be used to create a nuclear explosion.76 The IAEA
and the United States insisted that such a step had to be resisted vigorously,
and Washington pushed for U.N. trade sanctions.77 North Korea responded
71 Megawatt measurements refer to thermal output. The 25-megawatt reactor is also
referred to as 5-megawatt reactor which indicates electrical output.
Perry, supra note 1, at 276.
7 The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, has estimated that at
least one nuclear device may have been built. Perry, supra note 1, at 276. The former KGB
Chief, Vladimir Kryuchkov, has also been quoted in Russia's IZvESTIA as stating that "the
[North Korean] development of the first nuclear explosive device had been completed at the
nuclear research center in the town of Yongbyon." And That Was in 1990, AIR FORCE MAG.,
Aug., 1994, at 79; On the North Korean Beat, ECONOMIST, July 2, 1994, at 23.
74 Correll, supra note 9, at 2; James Sterngold, The Key Issue on North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1994, § 1, at 14; Naughton, supra note 7.71 See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, North Korea Says It May Start Reactor; U.S. Still Optimistic
Agreement Will Hold, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1994, at A13.
76 The North Korean reactor requires refueling very soon, and the spent fuel can be
reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium. Perry, supra note 1, at 276.
'n U.S. Seeks Sanction against N. Korea, supra note 67, at 5; Michael R. Gordon, U.S.
Goes to U.N. to Increase the Pressure on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1994, at Al.
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by vowing to interpret economic sanctions as an "act of war".7"
However, after mediation by former-President Jimmy Carter, North
Korea's hard-line leader, Kim I1 Sung, suddenly took a sharp conciliatory
turn and agreed to freeze North Korea's nuclear plans if the United States
would hold high-level talks." The United States has suggested the rods
could be sent to a third country, perhaps China, for safe-keeping, but the
North Koreans have rejected this idea, arguing that the rods belong to them
and they see no reason to give them up.' A compromise of encasing the
rods in concrete is being considered.8
At a summit in Geneva in August 1994, the North Koreans asked for
diplomatic recognition from the United States and a $2 billion light-water
nuclear reactor,8 2 a state-of-the-art model which produces little plutonium,
in return for suspending its alleged scheme to build nuclear weapons.
8 3
However, North Korea has repeatedly and publicly stated that it will not
allow inspections of two suspected waste sites which would give clues to
past nuclear activities, saying that any agreement with Washington will apply
only to future nuclear developments." The United States and South Korea
have been equally adamant that they cannot be expected to rebuild North
Korea's nuclear infrastructure without establishing what has been done
7 War or Peace for Korea?, EcONOMIST, June 18, 1994, at 37.
'9 Robert S. Greenberger & Steve Glain, Carter Briefs White House on North Korea,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 1994, at A6; R. Jeffrey Smith, Promising Signs Seen in N. Korea,
WASH. POST, June 17, 1994, at A20.
go America and North Korea; Progress, Perhaps, supra note 14, at 32.
8' Paul Greenberg, A Familiar Ring to Korean Promises, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug.
19, 1994, at B6.
' Russia and Japan are prepared to help North Korea with the light-water reactor.
Nicolai Geronin, Russia Ready to Help North Korea with Light-Water Reactor, ITAR-TASS,
Aug. 23, 1994; Japan Ready to Help North Korea Build Light Water Reactors, Agence France
Presse, Aug. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File. In addition, South
Korea has agreed to help North Korea, but "only if complete inspections ensure that the North
has not developed any bombs." N. Korea Repeats Vow to Refuse Inspections of Key Nuclear
Sites, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1994, at All.
The North Koreans, at a summit on September 23, 1994, increased their demand to an
additional $2 billion in compensation for lost power from two graphite reactors that are
almost completed, which the United States rejected. Naughton, supra note 7.
s3 Naughton, supra note 7.
8m Jack R. Payton, Some Optimistic Signs Emerge in Korea Crisis, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at 2A; N. Korea Again Rejects Special Inspections, UPI, Aug. 23,
1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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already. 85 If the United States and South Korea stand by their demand, and
if North Korea continues to reject it-as both sides give all indications of
doing-the broad Geneva agreement is not likely to be implemented
smoothly.
Critics contend that the Clinton administration's accommodating
approach 6 allows North Korea to keep rewriting the rules, and that the U.S.
government is basing its hopes of capping North Korea's nuclear program
on the "very weak" assumption that the IAEA will be allowed to monitor the
irradiated fuel from Yongbyon. s7 North Korea's promise to keep its
obligations under the NPT has generally been met with skepticism due to the
government's reputation for unpredictable rescission and brinkmanship.8'
The skeptics believe that the North Koreans are simply stalling, and that the
U.N. Security Council will have to impose sanctions in the end. 9
B. Scope of Proposed Economic Sanctions Against North Korea
The U.S. proposal to other U.N. Security Council members on June 15,
1994, was far less punitive than the measures first advocated by the U.S.
government. Because of opposition from China, the resolution would not yet
impose a trade embargo on North Korea.' Instead, it would "halt North
Korea's export and import of arms, end U.N. technical assistance, ban
technical and scientific assistance, reduce the number of diplomats at North
Korean embassies around the world, and curtail cultural, scientific, and
educational exchange programs."9'  These sanctions would be phased in
after a 30-day grace period following adoption by the Council.92 A ban on
' Steven Greenhouse, Clinton Demanding North Korean Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 1994, at A6.
86 See Fisher, supra note 17 (asserting that President Clinton briefly lost control over his
foreign policy by sending former-President Carter to North Korea and reversing his policy).
Chanda, Forgive and Forget?, supra note 68, at 14-15.
u The Defense Intelligence Agency has said that North Korea will continue its nuclear
weapons program despite any agreements it signs. James R. Asker, Going Ballistic,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Aug. 15, 1994, at 19.
See, e.g., America and North Korea; Progress, Perhaps, supra note 14, at 32; Fisher,
supra note 17.
90 China's position is important because it wields a veto in the U.N. Security Council,
supplies oil and food to North Korea, and has a long border with North Korea.
91 Stanley Meisler, U.S. Urges U.N. to Impose Mild N. Korean Curbs, L.A. TIMES, June
16, 1994, at Al.
92 Id.
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transfers of money from North Koreans living in Japan to relatives and
friends in North Korea has been postponed but remains an option even in the
event of a Chinese veto.
III. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA?
A. Legitimacy of Universal Economic Sanctions
North Korea's alleged plan to develop nuclear arms is a serious threat to
nonproliferation, and the international community has reached a general
consensus that the North Koreans need to be stopped.93 The diplomatic
talks have so far been unsuccessful and there is a growing sense that
sanctions may be necessary.' Pursuant to the purposes of the United
Nations articulated in the Charter, i.e., "[t]o maintain international peace and
security... [and] the prevention and removal of threats to the peace," 95 the
U.N. Security Council will first consider whether there is a "threat to the
peace", "breach of the peace", or an "act of aggression" under Article 39.
Since the Charter does not provide definitions of these terms, the existence
of such a condition is entirely within the Council's discretion, and the
decision is made on an ad hoc basis.'
The General Assembly defined "act of aggression" as "the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty.., of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations". 97 While it is
not clear from the language of this definition whether a "breach of peace"
should be distinguished from an "act of aggression", the term "breach of
peace" has nonetheless been used to describe violations involving armed
" See Statement at Confirmation Hearing, Lynn E. Davis, Under Secretary-Designate for
International Security Affairs, March 17, 1993, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Mar. 21, 1994.
94 Alan Riding, U.S. and North Korea Announce Pause in Talks, but No Progress, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 30, 1994, at A3; U.S. Says Talks with North Korea Deadlocked, GAZETTE
(MONTREAL), Oct. 2, 1994, at B7; U.S. Cautious about Talks with North Korea, CHRISTIAN
SCL MONITOR, Sept. 15, 1994, at 5.
95 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
9' See, e.g., International Court of Justice: Order with Regard to Request for the
indication of provisional Measures in the Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie
(Libya v. United States), April 1992, 31 I.L.M. 662.
97 G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974). See Article 3 of the Annex to that document for examples of the acts of aggression.
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attacks which fell within the definition of "act of aggression." For instance,
the North Korean armed attack on South Korea was termed a "breach of
peace, '98 and likewise, the invasion of Kuwait by military forces of Iraq
constituted a "breach of international peace and security."
On the other hand, the term "threat to international peace and security"
was used to condemn violations that were outside the scope of the definition
of "act of aggression." For example, the proclamation of independence by
the illegal authorities in Southern Rhodesia ' ° and the large-scale killing
of peaceful demonstrators protesting discriminatory racial policies in South
Africa"°1 were "threats to international peace and security." Likewise, the
Haitian humanitarian crises, which included mass displacement of the
population, also qualified as a "threat to international peace and securi-
ty.,,10
2
The current state of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, without
further violations, does not appear to be an "act of aggression" or a "breach
of the peace", since it has not yet reached the stage of "use [of] armed force
... against the territorial integrity or political independence" of another
sovereign state.' °3  The potential threat of the North Korean nuclear
weapons program, however, may be considered similar to the racial conflict
in South Africa, where the Security Council found the existence of a
"potential threat to international peace and security" (emphasis added). |°4
The issue in South Africa was racial conflict resulting from the continued
application of Apartheid and the constant build-up of the South African
military and police forces. The extensive build-up of the armed forces was
said to pose a "real threat to the security and sovereignty of ... the
neighboring states,"'" and this threat was the basis for strengthening the
already existing arms embargo.
North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program, coupled with its
history of illegal arms exportation, presents a significant threat to the
international community's efforts to prevent the spread of global nuclear
weapons. It represents a dangerous precedent of challenging the international
98 S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 473rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/4/Rev.I (1950).
99 S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
'0o S.C. Res. 219, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1270th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/20/Rev.1 (1965).
'0' S.C. Res. 134, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 856th mtg., U.N. DOC. S/INF/15/Rev.1 (1960).
'02 S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., ST/LIB/SER.B/5.30 (1993).
103 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
'04 S.C. Res. 282, U.N. SCOR, 25th Sess., 1549th mtg., U.N. Doc. SAINF/25 (1970).
105 Id.
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non-proliferation regime and also threatens peace and security in the Korean
Peninsula and Asia.'(* The Security Council acknowledged the importance
of the situation by passing a resolution calling on North Korea to remain in
the NPT and to cooperate with the IAEA." 7 The resolution also called on
all member states to "encourage" North Korea to honor its non-proliferation
obligations."m The stage seems set for further necessary measures in the
event that North Korea ignores the consensus of the international community
and continues to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, it is likely that the
Security Council will find the existence of a "threat to peace and security,"
as required under Article 39, which would then enable the Council to take
necessary measures under Articles 41 and 42.
In deciding the scope of the "necessary measures," the Council would
consider in general: (1) the possibility of general application of the measures
chosen and the willingness of the member states to enforce them; (2) the
estimated effectiveness of the measures in relation to North Korea's
economy, its sensitivity to external pressure, and the goals of the sanctions
policy; and (3) the minimization of cost and damage to the economies of the
sender countries.' °9 These considerations will affect the form and scope
of non-military sanctions imposed under Article 41.
B. Goals Furthered by Economic Sanctions
Most scholars agree that economic sanctions serve several analytically
distinct but not mutually exclusive goals. l The major purposes of
economic sanctions includes compelling a change in behavior, showing
disapproval and deterring future actions of others, and limiting economic and
military capabilities.
'06 See Robert L. Gallucci, Statement by the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military
Affairs before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, June 9, 1994, U.S. DEP'T STATE
DISPATcH, June 27, 1994.
10' S.C. Res. 825, U.N. SCOR, May 11, 1994.
10 Id.
109 See DOXEY, supra note 19, at 97-110.
"o See DAUDI & DAiANi, supra note 18, at 161-66. See also David Leyton-Brown,
Lessons and Policy Considerations about Economic Sanctions, in THE UTILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANcTIoNs 303 (David Leyton-Brown ed., 1987).
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1. Compelling Changes of Behavior
Though "[t]he history of sanctions has led some observers to conclude that
sanctions are 'ineffective'," 1 " such criticism may be overly generalized and
consider only one purpose that sanctions serve: to change the target
country's policy. From the traditional viewpoint,"2 where sanctions are
means to "coerce target governments into particular avenues of re-
sponse,"'113 success is measured by changes in the target's behavior that
analysts can attribute to the economic sanctions." 4 Sanctions work by
creating economic hardship in the target country, inducing the target's
governing regime to capitulate to foreign pressure and abandon its objection-
able policy."1 5  Consequently, sanctions are considered ineffective when
they do not cause significant economic damage in the target nation.
In the situation in the Korean peninsula, the international community is
ultimately seeking North Korean abandonment of its nuclear ambition." 6
1 Jones, supra note 44, at 246. See, e.g., MIYAGAWA, supra note 32, at 203.
112 There are different views about how to measure the success of economic sanctions.
David Baldwin, for example, asserts that economic sanctions have multiple objectives, such
as responding to domestic demands for action or sending disapproval signals to third
countries. Measuring success solely by policy change is misleading, he argues, and the
success of sanctions will be underestimated. DAVID BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFr 130-
34 (1985).
113 HUFBAUER ET AL,, supra note 18, at 9.
114 See generally, HUFBAUER ET AL., CASE HISTORIES, supra note 41. The authors
evaluated each economic sanction by observing the "response of target country" and
"economic impact." The success of sanctions was determined by considering the extent to
which the policy outcome sought by the sender country was in fact achieved and the extent
to which the sanctions (as opposed to other measures, such as military action) contributed to
the positive outcome.
115 WILLIAM H. KAEMPFER & ANTON D. LOWENBERG, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 161 (1992).
116 Robert L. Gallucci, the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, stated that the
objectives of the U.S. policy are a "nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and a strong non-
proliferation regime":
We must ensure that North Korea does not possess nuclear weapons and
will not build them in the future. That means North Korea must agree to:
-Full membership in the NPT;
-Full cooperation with the IAEA in implementing full scope safeguards,
including special inspections and other measures to clear up the discrep-
ancies in the N.P.R.K.(North Korea)'s past declaration; and,
-Full implementation of the South-North Denuclearization Accord,
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A more immediate goal to be achieved by economic sanctions would be to
induce the North Koreans to cooperate with the IAEA in implementing full-
scope safeguards. Achieving these goals would require the participation of
every nation and a sanctions package that is comprehensive in coverage 1
a. Compliance By Other States
In order for sanctions to be most effective in changing the target country's
objectionable policy, every state must comply. Widespread compliance
minimizes the target country's opportunities to redirect trade. Unless all
existing or potential trade partners cooperate with the sanctions resolutions,
the availability of alternate goods and capital markets lessens the effect of
the sanctions on the target.
Past experiences with economic sanctions demonstrate this point clearly.
As discussed earlier, the sanctions against Italy in 1935-36 are a good
example of a failure due to a lack of cohesion." 8 A more recent example
of such a problem is the former Yugoslavia. Since the fall of the Soviet
Union, many Eastern European countries have been experiencing difficulties
in their transition to independence and autonomy." 9  Since the day the
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for independence from the Yugoslav
Federation on March 1, 1992, there has been non-stop fighting among the
ethnically divided forces."2 The situation led the U.N. Security Council
to impose economic sanctions against the remaining members of the
Yugoslav Federation, Serbia and Montenegro. 2' Serbia in particular was
singled out due to suspicion that it had assisted the Bosnian Serbs in carrying
which bans uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities and provides
for a bilateral inspection regime.
Hearing of the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Fed.
News, June 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File.
11 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 18, at 3.
"8 See supra note 24.
"9 See Yoshiko Inoue, Comment, United Nations' Peace-Keeping Role in the Post-Cold
War Era: The Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 16 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 245 (1993)
(describing the development of the conflict in Yugoslavia and the involvement of the United
Nations).
120 Id.
121 S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3082nd mtg. (1992); S.C. Res. 820, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 320th mtg. (1993).
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out acts of aggression. 22 The purpose of the sanctions was to force Serbia
to cut off supplies and support for the Bosnian Serbs, who have seized
seventy percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.23 The sanctions have been
tightened gradually to allow only essential food and medicine into Serbia and
Montenegro. However, neighboring countries, especially the former
Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, have continued to trade with the target
states in violation of the sanctions,"2 and shops are reportedly still full of
smuggled goods. Though it appears that economic sanctions did eventually
cripple the Serbian economy and persuade Serbia to cut ties with Bosnian
Serbs,"z alternative sources of trade have diminished the effectiveness of
the sanctions and extended the length of time necessary to realize the goals.
China and Japan will play a crucial role in implementing sanctions against
North Korea. Historically and geographically, these countries have been
North Korea's closest allies and trading partners. 26 China has been and
2 Id.
'23 The Big Leak in Serbia Embargo: Nervous, Needy Macedonia, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1993, § 1, at 12.
" Gary Hufbauer, The Futility of Sanctions, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1994, at A14; The Big
Leak in Serbia Embargo: Nervous, Needy Macedonia, supra note 123, at 12. See also Roger
Thurow, Embargo Busting, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1994, at A1; Louis J. Salome & Bob Deans,
Survival Comes First: Macedonia Winks at Smuggling into Yugoslavia, ATLANTA CONST.,
June 12, 1994, at G5.
'2 Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said on September 4, 1994, that the
federal government is strictly implementing its decision to sever all relations with Bosnian
Serbs. Foreign Minister: Sanctions Are Greatest Obstacle to Peace, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
'26 China was North Korea's biggest trading partner in 1993, accounting for $932.8
million of the $2.75 billion in transactions; next was Japan with $471 million. Trading with
Russia was $457.7 million; and with South Korea (via third countries) was $171.2 million.
The North Korean trade deficit last year was $790 million. The major import item was crude
oil, while most export items were raw materials. North Korea's 1993 Global Trade Falls,
While Trade with China Rises 27 Percent, INT'L TRADE REP., Aug. 24, 1994, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Intrad File. China supplies 72% of North Korea's food, 75% of its
oil, and 88% of the coking coal needed for steel production. Holger Jensen, Sanctions against
N. Korea Simply Won't Work, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 24, 1994, at 29. For information on
North Korea's 1992 trading, see North Korea-Trade Overview, MARKET REP., Aug. 17, 1993,
available in LEXIS, World Library, Mktrpt File. See also The Youngbyon Test, ECONOMIST,
June 4, 1994, at 14.
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remains North Korea's single most important ally'27 and played an impor-
tant role in bringing North Korea to the negotiating table in June 1994.' s
Though China has so far opposed the sanctions option, it began showing
signs of cooperation with the United States on this issue in early October
1994." At the time of this Note, it is still not clear what course of action
China will pursue in the event that an unsuccessful conclusion of the U.S.-
North Korea talks forces a Security Council vote.
China's opposition would be a critical obstacle to implementation of the
economic sanctions against North Korea because of its veto power as a
permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. China's concern is that
economic sanctions would trigger the premature fall of the North Korean
government, resulting in a massive exodus of refugees to its border."3
More importantly, China does not want North Korea to collapse because a
divided Korean Peninsula serves Beijing's long-term strategic interests.13'
A unified Korea under Southern hegemony-an inevitability, given the
economic disparity between the two regions-would place a close U.S. ally
right on the Chinese border.1 32  Therefore, the United States tailored the
proposed sanctions to obtain China's approval and limited the scope of
sanctions to the export and import of arms and technical assistance.133
Japan will also play an important role, since it is the second largest trading
partner of North Korea."3 More importantly, the hard currency remittanc-
es sent by Japanese Koreans to Pyongyang are a very important source of
" North Korea's relationship with China was tested and strengthened through the Korean
War and the fall of the Soviet Union. Chinese President Jiang Zemin recently said that ties
between the two countries remained "as close as lips and teeth." Mirrill Goozner, In Asia,
Lack of Coherent Strategy May Prove Costly, CHICAGO TRIB., July 3, 1994, at IC.
12 Id.
'2 U.S. and China Form United Front on North Korea, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 4,
1994, at A5.
" Goozner, supra note 127, at IC. Such a refugee problem developed after Haiti's
repeated political crises following the overthrow of the Duvalier regime in 1986. See, e.g,
No Good Reason to Invade Haiti, N.Y. TIMEs, July 13, 1994, at A18.
13' Goozner, supra note 127, at IC.
132 l&
13 See China Holds the Key, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 13, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file (Washington knows that without China's support, its plans
for sanctions will be fruitless); Stanley Meisler, U.S. Urges U.N. to Impose Mild N. Korean
Curbs, L.A. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at Al.
134 North Korea-Trade Review, supra note 127.
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hard currency for North Korea. 35 Initially hesitant, Japan has cooperated
so far with the U.S. drive for the sanctions." Even if China vetoed the
U.N. sanctions, Japan could still agree to ban the remittances to North Korea,
thereby causing serious currency problems in North Korea.
b. Severity and Comprehensiveness of Sanctions
Sanctions must be painful enough to force the North Koreans to reconsider
proceeding with their nuclear weapons program, yet delicate enough to leave
open the possibility of a diplomatic solution. 7 The condition of the
target's economy is one of the best indicators of potential success of
sanctions and determines the severity and comprehensiveness necessary to
induce the purported change of policy. 3 ' A study of all the major eco-
nomic sanctions reveals a direct correlation between the political and
economic health of the target country and its susceptibility to economic
pressure.' 39 Economic sanctions are most likely to be successful if they
are targeted against a relatively weak and unstable country."" Countries
with extensive internal economic resources are not likely to feel sufficiently
pressured by external sanctions to make changes; likewise, economic
pressure alone would probably not affect a strong, stable government.1
41
The bankrupt North Korean economy may seem an easy target for
economic sanctions. 142  External trade has fallen sharply while the trade
deficit has risen, " and hardly any foreign currency is available.'" Full-
13 Quentin Hardy, Pressure Builds on a Japanese Bank That Funnels Money to North
Korea, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1994, at A10. Much of foreign currency in North Korea is sent
by the North Koreans who live in Japan. Since some currency is sent through travelers, the
exact amount of remittances is unknown, but estimates run as high as $1 billion a year. Id.
" Japan to Act within Constitution on N. Korean Nuke Issue, JAPAN ECON. NEWS WIRE,
July 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
' Michael R. Gordon, White House Asks Global Sanctions on North Koreans, N. Y.
TIMEs, June 3, 1994, at Al.
138 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 18, at 82.
139 id.
140 Id. at 36-37.
141 id.
142 Nicholas Eberstadt, The Coming Collapse of North Korea, ASIAN WALL ST. J., July
2, 1990, at 13.
143 North Korea's volume of export was $1.85 billion in 1990; $1 billion in 1992; and
$980 million in 1993. Japanese sources believe that the North Korean economy contracted
by five percent in 1992, and by 2.4 percent in 1993-its fifth consecutive year of decline.
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scale trade sanctions, including a ban on oil shipments, would be most
effective, since North Korea depends on imported oil for its energy
needs.1 45 However, China may not be willing to accept such sanctions at
this point, and the oil ban has consequently not been included in the
proposed plan of economic sanctions. In addition, North Korea is an isolated
country whose trading is conducted primarily with China and Japan.
Economic sanctions may not bring the expected effect when further isolating
a country which is already accustomed to isolation, especially if China
refuses to cooperate with the sanctions and continues its friendly relations
with North Korea.
The timetable is another important factor in the success of the international
economic sanctions. Economic sanctions applied in a gradual progression
lose their effect. 46 A gradual process allows the target country time to
reorganize its markets and sources of supply. 47 This theory appears to be
supported by the recent experiences with Yugoslavia. Sanctions hurt the
Serbian economy until January 1994, when the government introduced new
currency"4 that stopped hyperinflation and started bringing investment
back into the market.' 49 Since the proposed sanctions against North Korea
are mild and designed to be implemented gradually so as not to provoke
China's veto power, sanctions may not have the desired effect within a short
time frame and may allow North Korea to adjust to the situation.
Shim Jae Hoon, The Last Bunker, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 11, 1993, at 10; Balance of
Trade: North Korea's 1993 Global Trade Falls, While Trade with China Rises 27 Percent,
11 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 34, at 1304 (Aug. 24, 1994).
144 South Korean data indicates that North Korea has been defaulting on foreign debt
repayment of about $6.7 billion since the late 1980s. It has been reported that both China and
Russia, North Korea's principal trading partners, now insist on being paid in hard currency
for their exports because of this reputation. Shim Jae Hoon, supra note 143, at 10.
145 id.
146 DAOUDI & DAJANi, supra note 18, at 167.
147 Id.
" This currency is widely known as the "Avram," named after the economist Dragoslav
Avramovic, who introduced the currency to the Serbian market. He worked for 24 years at
the World Bank in Washington. Roger Cohen, Embargo Leaves Serbia Thriving, N.Y. TIMES,
May 30, 1994, § 1, at 3.
149 I ; James Rupert, Yugoslavia's Inflation Ebbs, but Stability Remains Precarious: New
Currency Helps Re-Stock Shelves, But Budget Cuts and Layoffs Possible, WASH. POST, Feb.
19, 1994, at A22; Laura Silber, Serbs Learn to Come to Terms with Sanctions: The United
Nations Trade Ban Has Hurt But Not Changed Many Minds, FIN. TIMES, June 3, 1994, § 3,
at 1.
[Vol. 24:307
NORTH KOREAN TIME BOMB
2. Disapproval and Deterrence
Even if a particular exercise of sanctions is not successful in bringing
about the desired policy changes,"5 the imposition of sanctions plays an
important role as a signal of disapproval which may cause alterations in
political behaviors of other countries."' Conversely, a lack of any action
may be perceived as acquiescence to the illegal behavior of the violator
country. In that sense, the North Korea problem sets a very important
precedent. The world's response to North Korea's violation of international
law will affect how other nations behave in the future. A unified front
against proliferation of nuclear arms will reduce the temptation to develop
nuclear weapons, while sending a warning to other rogue nations with similar
nuclear ambitions.' It is imperative, therefore, for the world community
to display united resolve in support of non-proliferation policy.
International economic sanctions also signal foreign support for the
political opposition within the target country, often helping opposition groups
to rally citizens against the ruling regime and thereby reducing the effective-
ness of government policy. 153 For example, the black resistance fighters
in Rhodesia, anti-communists in Nicaragua, and the African National
Congress in South Africa benefited from the sanctions in their struggles
against sanctioned regimes.
The late dictator Kim II-Sung's heavy-handed leadership was never
challenged, due in part to his heroic nationalist credentials dating back to the
country's struggle against Japanese colonialism.I" His heir, Kim Jong II,
lacks such a heroic past and does not share his father's charisma. 55 Even
if Kim has a firm grip on power, he faces a policy dilemma that carries the
'" "Despite the expectation that sanctions normally will not be designed with effective-
ness as a primary consideration, there is clearly a link between sanctions ... and political
responses in the target nations. Worldwide sanctions against white-ruled Rhodesia were
eventually rewarded with the fall of the white regime.... Sanctions against South Africa...
were followed a few years later by significant reforms of apartheid." DAOUDI & DAJANI,
supra note 18, at 164-65.
15 Id. See also BALDWIN, supra note 112, at 87.
152 See Vasey, supra note 10.
1 See generally KAEMPFER & LOWENBERG, supra note 21, at 117-35.
154 Kim Jong l's Inheritance, ECONOMIST, July 16, 1994, at 19.
155 Id.
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seeds of his destruction. 156 Keeping the country isolated and politically
rigid will result in widespread starvation and economic collapse, whereas
serious efforts at reform will either topple the regime or lead to a coup by
hard-liners. 157  The country is starving, and it is getting poorer. When
international economic sanctions take effect, Kim will be a much easier
target for an angry populace. 58 The existence of international disapproval
of the governing regime may further encourage dissenters within the country.
3. Preventing War Through Incapacitation of a Target Country
Economic sanctions may also serve the purpose of preventing war:
The concept of sanctions developed originally out of a fear
of war, and in our times especially, all-out nuclear war, with
its suicidal impact on both sides. ... [T]he real questions
are not whether economic sanctions have been successful in
the past, nor to what extent they have been successful in
forcing target nation or nations to comply, but rather
whether they prevent the outbreak of wars, and if so, how
and to what extent, and whether in the event of a conven-
tional war, they can accelerate the termination of hostili-
ties.'59
'5 Bruce W. Nelan, Lies and Whispers: Is Kim The Successor in Charge? Amid Mixed
Signals and Ambiguous Evidence, Only the Question is Clear, TIME, Sept. 5, 1994, at 51.
151 Id. See also Nikolaus Prede, Kim Jong Il Inherits His Father's Mantle, Ending
Speculations, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGETUR, Oct. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File (reporting the South Korean President's warning that Kim Jong II's power is not
stable and that South Korea must be prepared for the collapse of the Communist regime in
the North).
8ss There has already been talk of opposition to Kim Jung Il. See Nelan, supra note 156,
at 56. One rival center could be the million-troop armed forces, commanded by Defense
Minister 0 Jin U. Other potential rebels might be ambitious members of Kim's own family:
his stepmother, Kim Song Ae; his uncle, Vice President Kim Yong Ju; or his half-brother,
Kim Pyong I.
159 DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note 18, at 161. But see Leo Gross & Victor E.
Fitzmaurice, Economic Sanctions: Ideals and Experience. By M. S. Daoudi and M. S.
Dajani, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1985) (book review) (if economic sanctions really do
prevent or hasten the conclusion of armed conflict, argument concerning "effectiveness" is
meaningless).
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The ultimate fear about the proliferation of nuclear weapons is that they
.may be actually put to use. Considering the extensive military buildup and
suspected nuclear weapons program in North Korea, it is reasonable to
surmise that North Korea may be preparing for a nuclear war.'" The
desire of the international community to prevent such a disastrous event as
a full-blown nuclear war may lead to premature military action. Sanctions
may delay the military action by absorbing the initial need to "do some-
thing," while providing for a transitional period during which a compromise
solution may be attempted. 61
It is possible that the threat of international sanctions caused North Korea
to agree to talks with the United States, despite its appearance of defiance.
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's diplomatic visit seems to have
influenced the North Korean decision to talk, but the impending threat of
sanctions could have added weight to Carter's role as a mediator.'
62
C. The Problems of Economic Sanctions
1. Cost to Sender States
Sanctions are costly to the states that impose them, because they must
"6 The position represented by the Republican right points to two main dangers:
inevitable war once North Korea gets the bomb and the destruction of U.S. alliances with
South Korea and Japan. David C. Hendrickson, Recovery of Internationalism; United States
Foreign Policy, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 1994, at 26. Hendrickson argues that the error in this
position is the interpretation of North Korea's motive as nihilistic aggression rather than fear.
He contends that the pursuit of nuclear weapons plausibly offered North Korea protection it
could not obtain elsewhere, even if it risked inviting attack. Id.
161 DAOUDI & DAJANI, supra note 18, at 161. North Koreans responded to the threat of
economic sanctions with a counter threat that they would consider economic sanctions an "act
of war" and that they would turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." Perry, supra note 1, at 276.
Though such an act would be suicidal and is not likely to materialize, a similar situation-an
oil embargo against Japan-was partially responsible for triggering the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor. Kim Defiant, ECONOMIST, June 18, 1994, at 16.
162 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. For a brief analysis of Carter's "citizen
diplomacy," see Elaine Sciolino, Diplomatic Subcontracting's Fine If You Get Good Help,'
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25, 1994, § 4, at 6; Fisher, supra note 17; Jimmy Carter's Contribution,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, § 4, at 16.
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forgo gains from trade."6 In fact, many authors have argued that one of
the primary reasons sanctions fail is that they often are more costly to the
sender nations than to the target.' Participating countries may suffer loss
of trading opportunities, suspended contracts, and other economic hardships
that vary according to the sender's size and its relationship to the target
state. 165
The sanctions against Yugoslavia bring this problem to sharp focus."6
In the two years since the imposition of sanctions against Yugoslavia, the
economies of the nearby nations-particularly Hungary, Macedonia,
Romania, and Bulgaria-have been strained. The loss of Yugoslavia as an
export market has cost those countries billions of dollars in lost trade. 67
In the North Korean situation, however, this may be less of a problem,
since North Korea's major trading is limited to a few countries. Again,
China will be affected the most, and a plan to compensate the Chinese for
the trade loss through increased trading with other participating states,
favorable trade regulations, monetary compensation, etc.,168 may be
163 For example, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria have suffered greatly as a result of
international economic sanctions against neighboring Yugoslavia. Justin Burke, Who's Bit
by Serbia's Sanctions?, CHRISTIAN Scl. MONrrOR, May 18, 1994, at 24.
164 See, e.g., DAouDI & DAJANi, supra note 18, at 139-42. The U.S. grain embargo
against the Soviet Union is a classic example of economic sanctions in which the cost to the
target country was much less than the cost to the sanctioner. Id.
'65 A suggestion is made that "the more effective a sanctions policy, the higher its
probable cost to the sender." Leopold Lovelace, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (2d Ed),
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 178, 179 (1993) (book review).
166 For background of the Yugoslavian crisis, see Kelly A. Childers, Comment, United
Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkan Wars and the Changing Role of Peacekeeping
Forces in the Post-Cold War World, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 117 (1994).
167 Burke, supra note 163, at 24; The Big Leak in Serbia Embargo: Nervous, Needy
Macedonia, supra note 123, at 12.
'6 Article 50 of the U.N. Charter provides:
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the
Security Council, any state.., which finds itself confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall
have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of
those problems.
See also U.N. Official Says Countries Suffering Indirectly from Sanctions Need Assistance,
8 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 5, at 173 (Jan. 30, 1991) (quoting Carl-August Fleishchhauer,
Undersecretary-General for legal affairs and legal counsel to the United Nations, who
suggested that international vehicles for assisting countries that have suffered indirect financial
harm from the use of economic sanctions must be developed if sanctions are to retain any
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necessary to encourage Chinese cooperation.
2. Human Price
Sanctions also carry a human price;9'9 the poor and the unemployed are
the most seriously affected. °70 While the leaders of the target country are
responsible for the actions that led to the sanctions, the common citizens
suffer the most. Opponents of economic sanctions argue that sanctions are
"intrinsically wicked"' 7 ' because they lead to the foreseeable deprivation
of civilians of food and medicine, and concern is rising at the United Nations
over the human cost of the embargoes the Security Council has imposed on
Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Haiti.
72
The Haitian situation clearly demonstrates the problem of human costs.
Three years after the military coup overthrew the first democratically elected
government of Haiti, international economic sanctions to "restore democracy
in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, Jean-
Bertrand Aristide"' 73 have resulted in extreme human suffering among the
poorest. For example, Haiti has one of the highest mortality rates in Latin
America and the Caribbean: in 1990, the crude death rate was estimated at
thirteen per 1,000, almost double the Latin American average."' Econom-
global validity in the future).
169 Marynell DeVaughn, Effects and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions, 84 AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 203, 211 (1990).
'0 Currently in Haiti, garbage collection has been suspended and electricity is unavailable.
In addition, the unemployment rate is higher than 50%. Id. However, the elite in Haiti have
managed to smuggle goods and fuel from the Dominican Republic, which shares the
Caribbean Island of Hispaniola with Haiti. Cesar Chelala, Haiti: Fighting for Survival,
Swiss REV. WORLD AFF., Sept. 1, 1994.
17 Hendrickson, supra note 160, at 26.
17 See generally Larry Everest, The Trouble with Economic Sanctions, L.A. DAILY J.,
Feb. 4, 1992, at 6. Sanctions can be a far less discriminating weapon than bombs. Today
an estimated one million Iraqi children are malnourished as a result of both sanctions and
wartime destruction. Though food and medicine may officially be exempted from the
sanctions, without export earnings, the target country may not have money to buy them. Paul
Lewis, U.N. Is Worried by Human Cost of Embargoes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1993, § 1, at
21. 21 3 S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg., U.N. Doc. ST/LIB/SER.B/S.30
(1993).
"" The current crisis has reportedly hurt mainly the middle and lower classes of the
population, while economically benefiting the upper bourgeoisie and higher military ranks.
Chelala, supra note 170.
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ic sanctions against North Korea may result in similar suffering of innocent
people. A food crisis has already begun developing in North Korea where
children are stunted for lack of vitamins.'75 Even without sanctions, the
factories are idle for lack of fuel and raw materials. 17
6
3. Cost of Reconstruction
Another problem with sanctions is the cost of reconstruction after
sanctions cripple economic activities in the target country. " For example,
the task of directing Haiti on the road to recovery is staggering: Haiti's
problems include a heavily armed and deeply polarized society, nonfunction-
ing institutions, decayed infrastructure, severely denuded land, and a lack of
democratic tradition.7 8  An international trade embargo could cause the
North Korean economy to collapse along with the government of Kim Jong
Il-a prospect that scares South Korea almost as much as a military conflict.
A premature reunification of Korea would force South Korea to spend
anywhere from $200 billion to more than $1 trillion over approximately a
decade on reconstruction costs to absorb the North.'79 Additionally, the
fifty-year separation of ideology caused by the North Korean hard-line
government may cause significant adjustment problems'8 °
171 Chanda, Point-Counterpoint, supra note 3, at 16 (reporting that North Korea already
faces a rice shortage of an estimated two million tons this fall).
176 Kim Jong l's Inheritance, supra note 154, at 19. See also Susan V. Lawrence, Inside
the Hermit Kingdom. U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Sept. 19, 1994, at 53.
"n Larry Rohter, Mission in Haiti: The Obstacles; Grim Shadow of Economic Reality,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1994, § 1, at 16.
17' Linda Robinson & Hannah Taylor, No Quick Fix for Haiti, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REP., Aug. 29, 1994, at 36. According to one estimate, $200 million will be immediately
required for emergency aid, government spending, and restarting business; an additional $5
billion is needed to rebuild infrastructure and resume production. Id. Haiti was already in
shambles when a military coup ousted President Aristide in September 1991. In the 1980s,
the economy contracted 15%; by the end of 1994, it will have shrunk another 30%. Id.
'9 Andrew Pollack, The World: Unifying? Not Now, Please, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994,
§ 4, at 3 (reporting that the collapse of Kim Jong Il's government would force a sudden
reunification, which could destroy South Korea's prosperity). See also S. Korea Wants Quiet
Change, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrroR, Sept. 2, 1994, at 19.
1S0 North Koreans have been taught to worship Kim II Sung as the Great Leader, the
Beloved Leader, and the Greatest Genius Mankind Has Ever Had. Kim Jong Il's Inheritance,
supra note 154, at 19. They have also been taught that South Korea is a "Puppet for the
Beast" (i.e. the United States), and that South Koreans are starving. To prepare for the
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D. Possible Alternatives
1. Do Nothing
One option is to do nothing and wait for the present North Korean regime
to collapse, which is the preferred course of China and a number of Japanese
political leaders."' This belief in an impending implosion of the present
regime is thought to be one reason for South Korea's and Japan's earlier
position of "patience" and "timidity" about imposing sanctions. 8 2 Some
also argue that North Korea may be deterred from actual use of its nuclear
weapons, as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War.
8 3
However, North Korea's unchecked nuclear capability could put North
Korea in a position to subject South Korea to extortion in establishing its
terms for unification.' If the United States appears weak or irresolute,
the Asians will conclude that they have two choices: accept North Korea's
nuclear advantage and accommodate it, or acquire their own nuclear
weapons.' 85 Therefore, other countries in the region may seek their own
nuclear weapons in self-defense.18
differences in culture, value system, and political ideology, the South Korean Department of
Education has already begun developing "educational materials to be used after reunification"
as well as plans to train teachers. KOREAN S.E. NEWS, Aug. 23, 1994, at 45.
'a' Some Japanese leaders fear that an aggressive approach to the North Korean problem
in the form of sanctions might lead to a war with South Korea, which would have serious
ramifications for Japan and the region as a whole. Mainichi Survey, MAINICHI DAiLY NEWS,
May 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file. Earlier in 1994, a majority
of Koreans also supported a policy of patience and inter-Korean dialogue as a means to
resolve the nuclear problem, but the Korean public later took an increasingly tough position
that the Clinton Administration should "stiffen its position in pressing Pyongyang." James
Sterngold, South Korean President Lashes Out at U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1994. § 1, at 3.
182 Kim Jong l's Inheritance, supra note 154, at 19. Officials of the South's National
Unification Board would prefer to see reconciliation with the North move through three
stages. In the first stage, diplomatic contacts would build mutual trusts. The South would
invest in special zones in the North, creating pockets of industry that will survive reunifica-
tion. During the second stage, the border would stay closed to prevent a flood of southbound
North Korean workers. Only when the South's investment in the North has narrowed the
economic gap between North and South will the two regions move for the final stage of full
unification. Id.
183 Perry, supra note 1, at 277.
184 Correll, supra note 9, at 2.
185 Id.
1" Perry, supra note 1, at 276-77.
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Moreover, as mentioned earlier, this option carries with it the risk of
allowing North Korea to export nuclear technology to other aggressive
nations, which is the main concern of the United States. 87  As a result,
counter-proliferation of nuclear weapons may occur not only in Asia but also
all over the world through North Korea's arms trade, which will seriously
undermine the future of the NPT.
In addition, the "do-nothing" policy would be contrary to American public
opinion. The public believes that the situation on the Korean Peninsula
poses a threat to American allies and that the United States should stop
North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons.88 Though this does not
necessarily mean that the United States must be ready to strike anytime its
interests are threatened, the public wants the U.S. government to demonstrate
strength, decision, and leadership.1
8 9
2. Military Action
Another option, advocated by several senior officials from the administra-
tion of former-President George Bush, is to use military force to destroy
North Korea's nuclear facilities. 9° However, this pre-emptive military
action carries with it the possibility of provoking a counter-attack on South
Korea, if not a full-blown second Korean War.'9 North Korea is "the
most militarized nation on the globe"' 92 and has an intimidating conven-
17 Id.
1' For example, nearly 70% of Connecticut residents believe that the United States should
stop North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons. Michael Remez, State Residents Perceive
Increased Korea Threat; Courant-Isi Connecticut Poll; Foreign Policy, HARTFORD COURANT,
June 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Cf David Lauter, The Times
Poll; 51% Would Back Force over N. Korea A-Arms, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1993, at Al
(78% of Americans consider the current North Korean situation a serious threat); North
Korean Nuclear Threat, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1993, at B6 (51% of Americans feel so strongly
about nuclear weapons that they would support the use of force against North Korea to
eliminate them).
189 See Correll, supra note 9. For criticism that Clinton's approach is too naive and
accommodating, see Fisher, supra note 17; Sterngold, supra note 181.
190 See Correll, supra note 9.
191 Clinton's Team Breathes Easy at North Korea Accord: Agreement Emerges to Freeze
Nuclear Plans and Hold Talks, FIN. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at 8.
92 War or Peace for Korea?, supra note 78, at 37. North Korea has an active force of
1.3 million soldiers, 3,700 tanks and more than 500 units of self-propelled artillery, compared
to 237,700 soldiers in Japan and S. Korean forces of 633,000. Id.
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tional military force (fifth largest in the world).'93 North Korea is present-
ly developing ballistic missiles of increasing range which are powerful
enough to be launched against virtually any target in South Korea, Japan,
China, Russia, and other countries in the region."9 A military conflict
could cost several million civilian lives and destroy Seoul, the South Korean
capital, which lies only thirty-five miles from the demilitarized zone
separating the two Koreas.'95
More importantly, there is a legitimacy problem. The U.N. Charter
prohibits "force against the territorial integrity" of a state.'9 Without
North Korea's "act of aggression" or "armed attack",' 9, the invocation of
the "self-defense" exception embodied in Article 51 of the U.N. charter will
not be justified. Though "self-defense" in anticipation of an attack may be
argued, there is no firm consensus on that doctrine, and justification of such
a pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear sites would be difficult.
Moreover, the inevitably unilateral character of the action would destroy
the confidence of Asian states in American leadership.' 98 It would trigger
an intense conventional conflict for which no public support or allied
consensus has been developed. 99 The American public does not support
the military option because it involves the loss of lives, including American
troops.20° Though the U.S. government has not ruled out the option of
193 Perry, supra note 1. North Korea invests about 25% of its gross domestic product in
its military, compared to 3% by the United States, South Korea, and Eastern European
countries, and 1% by Japan. Id. at 275. Total North Korean forces equal 1.1 million; S.
Korean forces, 633,000; U.S. troops in South Korea, 36,500; Japanese forces, 237,700; U.S.
troops in Japan, 1,900. War or Peace for Korea?, supra note 78, at 37.
194 Perry, supra note 1 at 275.
195 John Burton, Seoul on Hook of Unattractive Options: There Are Risks in Both War
and Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, June 6, 1994, at 6.
196 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
197 G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 97.
19 Hendrickson, supra note 160, at 26.
199 Id.
o In a poll taken in June 1994, only 35% of Connecticut residents favored the use of
force, while 74% supported the use of trade or other economic sanctions to stop the North
Koreans from developing nuclear weapons. Remez, supra note 188. Interestingly, in another
poll, 56% of men and 35% of women favored sending U.S. troops to help South Korea if it
was invaded by North Korea, signifying a split opinion. Split Decision on Korea, USA
TODAY, May 18, 1994, at 1A. But see Lauter, supra note 188, at Al (reporting that majority
of conservatives and Republicans would support the use of force in Korea). The public also
opposed the military action against Haiti. No Good Reason to Invade Haiti, N.Y. TIMES, July
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military action, it concedes that it should only be considered when all other
possibilities have been exhausted. 1
3. "Carrot and Stick" Diplomacy
The next option is one currently pursued by the U.S. government. It is a
diplomatic strategy that provides incentives for North Korea to give up its
nuclear ambition and open its doors to the rest of the world. 2  It also
includes the threat of economic sanctions if the incentives are not enough to
persuade North Koreans that a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula is in their best
interest. 2 3
This option, though more acceptable than others, is not without problems.
The incentives offered by the United States for North Korea include a very
expensive light-water nuclear reactor which will be used for electric power
generation, replacing its outmoded graphite-core models.204  It could
ultimately cost over $10 billion, take a decade or more to complete, and
require the upgrading of North Korea's entire power transmission sys-
tem.2' 5 The question of who would pay for and manage the modernization
of North Korea's antiquated coal-fired power plants, which would be needed
to sustain the economy until the new nuclear plant was built, would be a
tough hurdle to overcome. 6 The U.S. government is presently attempting
to recruit other countries such as Japan and South Korea in case this deal is
13, 1994, § A, at 18.
201 Perry, supra note 1, at 277.
2 Payton, supra note 84, at 2A.
2 This type of strategy is commonly called "carrot and stick" diplomacy. Douglas Jehl,
U.S. and North Koreans Discuss Nuclear Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1994, at A9; William
J. Taylor & Michael Mazarr, Defusing North Korea's Nuclear Notions, N.Y. TIMES, April 13,
1992, at A19.
'4 However, the new light-water reactors still give North Korea continued access to fuel
rods that could be used to make plutonium, even though they are less suited to plutonium
production than the graphite-moderated reactors that North Korea is now building. R. Jeffrey
Smith, North Korea Says It May Start Reactor; U.S. Still Optimistic Agreement Will Hold,
WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1994, at A13. But see Nelan, supra note 14, at 32. It is suspected
that the North Koreans lack the complex facilities to harvest plutonium from a light-water
reactor. Id.
205 James Stemgold, The Key Issue on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1994, § 1, at
14.
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finalized.0
Additionally, this option of buying out North Korea has been criticized
because North Korea would be rewarded undeservedly. Critics argue that it
might tempt other states to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty and
seek rewards for rejoining it.'
The credibility of the North Korean promise is another problem.
Diplomatic efforts by the U.S. and South Korean governments have long
been manipulated by Kim I1-Sung's continuing brinkmanship and have
achieved little.' North Korea's duplicity and prevarication in recent
months hardly provide a basis for good faith in agreements that may result
from diplomatic talks. The North Koreans may not be serious at all about
keeping promises; they may be just trying to buy time. Besides, the North
Koreans are not promising to destroy the nuclear weapons they are suspected
of possessing; they are merely promising to halt any further development.
Though it is hoped that the new leader, Kim Jong 11,210 will have a more
pragmatic attitude than Kim I1 Sung, the uncertainty about North Korean
leadership 211 since the death of Kim I1 Sung 12 seems to add another
reason to proceed with caution. 23 Any power struggle in Pyongyang could
hamper North Korea's ability to carry out agreements to terminate its nuclear
"7 See supra note 82.
"a Nelan, supra note 14, at 42; America and North Korea; Progress, Perhaps, supra note
14, at 32.
2" Sterngold, supra note 181, at 3.
210 Scott Plummer, Tame Kim the Younger or Face a Perilous Fall-Out, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Telegr File.
211 Kim Jong I is widely regarded as "unstable." Alice H. Amsden, U.S. Mustn't Tread
Too Quickly in Asia, NEWSDAY, Aug. 24, 1994, at A31.
212 Kim II Sung 'died on July 8, 1994. He was the only leader in North Korea's 46-year
history and his regime was known to be "the world's most isolated dictatorship." Shim Jae
Hoon, Lethal Legacy, FAR E. ECON. REv., July 21, 1994, at 14-15. See M. Lee, North Korea
and the Western Notion of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA: A CULTURAL
PERSPECrIvE 129, 131-37 (J. Hsiung ed. 1985) (reprinted in BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP
R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW at 883-87 (1991) (explaining the phenomenon of Kim Ii
Sung's "super-father" role in terms of the traditional Korean sense of loyalty).
213 See, e.g., James Sterngold, New Wrinkle in Korea Issue: Who Is in Charge in North?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1994, at Al; Gwen Robinson, Korean 'Dear Leader' Faces Power
Struggle, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 25, 1994 (delayed official confirmation of Kim Jong Il's
leadership and news of anti-Kim Jong II pamphlets as well as Kim's ill health indicate the
possibility of obstacles to the smooth transition of power).
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weapons program.2t 4
Despite cost and other problems, lack of other viable options may force
the West to agree to North Korea's terms in order to curb the present threat
of nuclear development. However, if North Korea's history of hostility and
defiance is any indication, any deal with North Korea is still precarious, and
the world may have to retreat to the starting point, the threat of universal
economic sanctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
International economic sanctions are an increasingly important tool of
foreign policy, and current social science tends to suggest that "sanctions
constitute an effective coercive weapon.
' 215
Though economic sanctions are almost never solely responsible for the
resolution of an international conflict, they are an important factor. When
applied effectively, they often contribute to change in the target's behavior.
Even when sanctions fail to change the target country's behavior, they
demonstrate unified disapproval, resolution, and even determination by those
applying the sanctions to undergo certain sacrifices to make a point-short
of the use of force. Sanctions may also deter other countries which would
otherwise similarly misbehave. They may increase pressure within the target
country against the governing regime which is responsible for the condemned
behavior. Sanctions may also prevent war by restricting further advancement
of the target country's illegal ambitions by denying access to technology and
assistance.
Economic sanctions do not come without cost, however. They hurt the
sender countries' economies, sometimes as much as they damage the target
country, which is a major reason for noncompliance. They also involve
great human cost in the target nation: poor living conditions, increasing
suicide and death rates, and even worsening human rights violations. The
primary victims are innocent people rather than the parties responsible for
the undesirable policy.
214 JiM Mann, Doubts Arise over N. Korea Nuclear Accord, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 19,
1994, at 26. South Korean president Kim Young Sam seems to believe that there may be
"abnormal development" in North Korea's power transition and warned his officials to prepare
for "unexpected events." Kim Chang Kee, Abnormal Movements in North Korea, CHOSUN
IL-BO, Aug. 25, 1994, at 4.
215 KAEMPFER & LOWENBERG, supra note 21, at 161.
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However, economic sanctions are often imposed because something needs
to be done, short of military action. The North Korean nuclear program
presents a real danger of proliferation of nuclear arms to the rest of the
world. If the North Koreans are not stopped now, other aggressive nations
may not be far behind in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Iran could
be next, and sooner or later, such states as Algeria, Iraq, Libya, and Syria
will either learn to make nuclear weapons or purchase them on the shadowy
arms market."' Such a wide diffusion of nuclear weapons in the hands of
many states and probably some non-state actors would place before the
international community the perpetual and ever more complex task of
constructing multiple nuclear deterrence relationships.
Because of the terrible human cost of reliance upon military force,'"
many believe that any alternative that avoids warfare should be taken
seriously.218 The economic and political effects of economic sanctions
depend on the conditions under which they are introduced, 219 and they may
work neither quickly nor without cost. They always involve economic losses
to the senders as well as the target, and the most severely affected are the
innocent. Because of these limitations and various costs, economic sanctions
should not be imposed without clear objectives and unified resolve.
The Korean crisis of 1994 is a rehearsal for crises to come. Containing
this problem will require nothing less than an urgent commitment to the
development of a broad international consensus.2' For lack of better
alternatives in situations like the North Korean crisis, the use of economic
measures is likely to be repeated. Now may be the time to re-evaluate
economic sanctions as a means of collective response to threats to interna-
216 Correll, supra note 9, at 2.
21' For example, while the United States' use of laser-guided munitions and general
avoidance of population centers during its air campaign against Iraq may have minimized
immediate civilian casualties during the Persian Gulf War, reports indicate that tens of
thousands of civilians have become secondary casualties, facing disease and death from the
combined results of damage to infrastructure, the embargo, and the civil strife that followed
the war. Edwin M. Smith, The Need for Effective Multilateral Sanctions, in The United
Nations Response to a Changing World: International Law Implications, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PRoc 303 (1992).
218 Id. at 308. But see the commentary by Oscar Schachter in the same panel discussion,
suggesting that economic sanctions are not always preferable because military action may be
decisive with a far less destructive impact on the people. Id.
219 DAouDI & DAJANI, supra note 18, at 162.
o Roger C. Molander & Peter A. Wilson, On Dealing with the Prospect of Nuclear
Chaos, WASH. Q., Summer 1994, at 16.
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tional peace and security. Much could be gained from developing a means
for systematically capitalizing on previously gained experience, e.g., from
Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Iraq. It will be unfortunate if future responses are left
to ad hoc procedures that do not benefit from the preservation of institutional
memory. Such ad hoc measures may easily be discarded as ineffective,
leading to force as the only viable option.221
Jeong Hwa Pires
", Smith, supra note 217, at 303.
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